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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a negligence case which stems from the fire destruction of certain leased property.
Appellant Tech Landing, LLC, leased a structure to Respondent JLH Ventures, LLC, whereon
Respondent operated a paintball business. Appellant contends that Respondent negligently caused
the fire which destroyed the property by negligent installation and maintenance of a clothes dryer
on the property. It is Appellant's contention on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion
in excluding testimony from Appellant's two expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition
to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, Appellant contends on appeal that
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no rational juror could
conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the fire.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about April 1, 2013, Appellant and Respondent entered into a lease agreement for a
structure of approximately 12,240 feet located at 3131 Harvard Street in Boise, Idaho. R., p. 832;
836. The agreement was executed by Robert Troy Mortensen on behalf of Appellant and by Lael
Haile on behalf of Respondent. R., p. 832. The Appellant owned the structure but leased the land
from the City of Boise. R., p. 902. Respondent, the lessee, used the property to operate a
recreational paintball facility.

R., p. 836. On or about August 11, 2017, a fire substantially

destroyed the structure that is part of the leased property. R., p. 902.
On November 9, 2017, Appellant initiated this action and filed its Complaint. R., pp. 714.

Appellant asserted the following causes of action against Respondent: breach of contract,

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. Id. As to the
negligence claim, Appellant claims that Respondent negligently caused the fire which destroyed
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the structure. R., p.6-7. More specifically, Appellant claims that Respondent was negligent in its
care and maintenance of the leased structure, including negligent installation and maintenance of
a clothes dryer on the property. Id.
On November 28, 2018, Respondent filed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R.,
pp. 24-25. In support of its motion relative to Appellant's negligence claim, Respondent submitted
the Declaration of Dennis Zigrang, the opinion of its retained expert witness. R., pp. 45-88. Mr.
Zigrang opined that while he could not determine the source of the fire, he was able to rule out the
laundry room and/or clothes dryer as a source or cause of the fire. R., p. 46.
On December 20, 2018, Appellant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Robert Troy Mortensen In Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Declaration of James F. Jacobson In
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R., pp. 506-741. The Declaration of
James F. Jacobson, attached as exhibits the Deposition of Jeremy Haile, as well as the expert
reports of Dean Hunt and David Cutbirth. R., pp. 561-741. On December 27, 2018, Respondent
filed Defendant's Motion to Strike, in an effort to strike the expert reports from Mr. Jacobson's
declaration. R., pp. 742-743. Respondent argued that the reports were inadmissible hearsay. R.,
pp. 744-745. On December 27, 2018, Respondents also filed their Reply Brief Re: Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment. R., pp. 762-777. Respondents argued that Mr. Cutbirth's report
did not meet the requirements under Rule 702 and Mr. Hunt's report failed to identify the specific
source of the fire. R., p. 776.
On December 31, 2018, Appellant filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion to Strike, along with the Declaration of David Cutbirth in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Dean Hunt in Opposition to Defendant's
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Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Supplemental Declaration of Robert Troy Mortensen In
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R., p. 788-889. Appellant argued that
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) and 56(e)(l) the District Court can allow
supplemented affidavits or further affidavits and can give parties an opportunity to properly
support or address the facts at issue. R., pp. 789-792. Then in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, Appellants argued that the declarations of Dean Hunt and David Cutbirth
provided expert opinions that the fire began in the laundry room and that the probable cause of the
fire was combustion in the drier vent. R., pp. 795-831.
The Declaration of Dean Hunt in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, provides Mr. Hunt's expert opinion that the fire began in the laundry room and that the
probable cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room which had been left running prior to
the fire. R., p. 814.
Mr. Hunt's report supports this conclusion by setting forth his qualifications. Mr. Hunt is
a fire consultant with Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc., and has significant experience in fire
investigation. R., p. 736. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Public Safety and Emergency
Management, and over 30 years' experience in fire service, including 19 years as a full time Fire
Investigator and Fire Marshal. Id. He is also a Certified Fire and Explosion Investigator (C.F.E.I.)
through the National Association of Fire Investigators as well as a Certified Fire Inspector II with
the International Code Council (ICC).

Id.

In addition, he has conducted over 600 fire

investigations and over 200 live fire training tests. Id.
Mr. Hunt's report further sets forth that he evaluated the two-story commercial building on
October 5, 2017 and details his process of elimination in determining the origin and the cause of
the fire. R., pp. 805-814. He explains that he began his evaluation with an examination of the
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exterior of the structure. R., p. 807. He methodically examined the west, south, east and north
walls, along with the bum patters and heat and smoke damage to each. R., p. 807-809. He
examined the electrical meter and main electrical switches on the east end of the south wall and
determined that they were damaged from heat in a manner consistent with external exposure to
heat; thus, he eliminated them as the cause of the fire. R., p. 808. He examined the roof which had
collapsed into the structure and noted that the fire damaged, bowed, wooden roof beams were lying
on the floor of the structure. R., p. 809.
He then systematically examined the interior of the structure. R., p. 809. He noted that he
examined the main electrical breaker panel on the south wall near the northeast comer of the
structure and found it to be heavily damaged from heat and flame. Id. It was not possible to
identify what position the switches were in and several had indications of electrical activity, but
the surrounding area was examined and the damage to the area where the electrical panel was
located was damaged less than that of other areas of the interior of the structure. Id. Thus, Mr.
Hunt eliminated it as the cause of the fire. Id.
The paint ball arena and props were studied. Id. The props included: wood props, three
vehicles, fabric drapes and plastic sheeting. Id. All were consumed by the fire except for the
vehicles. Id. Mr. Hunt interviewed Defendant's owner Jeremy Haile, and Mr. Haile stated that all
the fuel, oils and batteries had been removed from the vehicles when they were placed inside. Id.
The combustible materials in the vehicles had been consumed by the fire; thus, Mr. Hunt
eliminated them as the cause of the fire. Id.
He then examined the roof truss beams. Id. He noted that the beams were damaged from
heat and flame and that the damage extended from the south end of the structure to the north with
the damage increasing towards the north. Id. The north end of the structure consisted of two CMU
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block walled rooms. Id. One of the rooms was located between two overhead doors which was
damaged by heat and flame. R., p. 810. This had been the equipment room where the paintball
guns were serviced, stored and rented to patrons. Id. Mr. Hunt identified the burned remains of
everything in the room and determined that the contents were mostly noncombustible, and the fuel
load was minimal. Id. Accordingly, he eliminated this room as the area of origin. Id.
The room at the northeast comer of the structure, identified by the owner as the laundry
room, contained a clothes washer, two clothes dryers, an air compressor, refrigerator, a microwave
over, deep freezer and metal shelving that contained plastic masks that the customers wore. Id.
The walls of this room were covered with wood paneling attached to drywall. Id. A restroom was
attached to the south end of the room and an office on the second floor above. Id. Above the open
area and the laundry room was a wood cross-beam that spanned the open area and above the
laundry room. Id. The beam was damaged from heat and flame and the damage was more severe
above the southwest comer of the laundry room. Id. All the wood paneling had been consumed.
R., p. 811. Mr. Hunt examined the freezer, microwave and refrigerator and noted that the damage
to all was more intense at the front and decreased towards the rear. Id.

He examined the

compressor and the dryer next to it (the one not being utilized at the time of the fire). Id. The
interior of the dryer was damaged from heat but not from flame. Id. The side of the dryer that
was adjacent to the working dryer had a bum pattern that began at the rear-left comer at the bottom
of the dryer and extended from this point upwards and towards the front of the dryer. R., pp. 811812.
Mr. Hunt then examined the dryer that had been in use. R., p. 812. He provided that there
was a fire pattern along the left side of the dryer that began at the rear bottom comer of the dryer
and extended upward and toward the front of the dryer. Id. The interior was damaged from heat
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and flame. Id. There was a burn pattern on the exterior of the dryer, around the front-loading
door. Id. The electrical cord to the dryer was plugged into the 220-Volt outlet at the south wall
of the laundry room and the insulation to cord along the floor to the outlet was still intact. Id. A
flexible dryer vent duct was lying on the floor and was separated from the dryer. Id. There was a
hole melted in the aluminum duct 3 feet from the dryer connection. Id. Mr. Hunt provided that it
was reported to him by Respondents that prior to the fire the duct was attached at the west wall to
a piece of poly vinyl chloride (PVC) pipe that led to the exterior. Id. The PVC pipe had been
consumed by the fire. Id. Respondents further reported to Mr. Hunt that the dryer was purchased
used approximately twelve years prior to the fire and that it had never had any service or repairs
and the backs of the dryers had never been removed to clean lint from them.

Id. In addition,

Respondents reported to Mr. Hunt that the clothes dryer was left on and running when the last
employee left the business the night of the fire. Id.
Accordingly, based on the information above, Mr. Hunt determined that the fire originated
in the laundry room and that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room that
had been left running prior to the fire. R., p. 814. His opinion was based on his detailed evaluation
of the site, the fire patterns, his process of elimination, the damage to the structure and the items
inside, witness statements and his knowledge and experience. Id.
As to the Declaration ofDavid Cutbirth in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, it supplements the opinion of Mr. Hunt regarding the probable cause of the fire. R.,
794-799. Mr. Cutbirth's declaration provides his expert opinions and attaches his report. Id. Like
Mr. Hunt, his conclusions are supported by his qualifications. David Cutbirth, P.E., is a principal
electrical engineer licensed in the state of Idaho since 1998. R., p. 794. He is also president of
DC Engineering, an organization that provides consulting engineering services for commercial,
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industrial and retail facilities. Id. Mr. Cutbirth opines that it is his "professional opinion that the
fire was not caused by an electrical fault either within the drier or the wiring feeding the drier,"
but that "the fire was caused by combustion within the drier vent, at or near the PVC piping that
was utilized as an extension of a 'short' piece of drier venting to the outside wall exhaust." R., p.
795.
Mr. Cutbirth's declaration and report sets forth the methodology and principles he
employed in reaching his decisions, specifically, his knowledge, his site visit/evaluation, his
interview of Plaintiff, and the International Mechanical Code. R., pp. 797- 799. Mr. Cutbirth
notes that PVC and/or other non-metallic hard piped connections were utilized from the drier
exhaust to the outside connections. R., p. 798. He then notes that pursuant to the International
Mechanical Code Section 504.6.1 exhaust ducts for driers are to be constructed of metal and that
no exception was found in the Code that allows for PVC or other non-metallic substances. R., pp.
795; 798. Mr. Cutbirth explains the reasoning being that PVC's maximum operating temperature
is 140 degrees, while dryer discharge temperature may be as high as 155 degrees. Id. He further
opines based on his knowledge as an electrical engineer that PVC is prone for creating static
electricity when moving air, which is also likely to cause a buildup oflint. Id. Mr. Cutbirth opines
that these bases support his conclusion that the probable cause of the fire was combustion in the
drier vent. Id.
A hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on January 3, 2019.
TR., January 3, 2019: pp. 6-62. The District Court took the summary judgment motion under
advisement and reserved ruling on the evidentiary objections as well. Id.
On February 8, 2019, the District Court issued its Order Granting in Part and Denying in

Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. R., pp. 890-929. The Order began with the
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District Court's evidentiary rulings. With regard to Respondent's Motion to Strike, the District
Court held that it would allow the declarations of Mr. Hunt and Mr. Cutbirth to the extent that they
authenticated their reports. R., p. 892. However, the District Court held that the opinions of the
two experts on causation were inadmissible. R., pp. 893-900. The District Court held that the
opinions of Mr. Hunt and Mr. Cutbirth were speculative and that they failed to opine on the specific
ignition sequence of the fire. R., pp. 893-895; 897-900. The District Court also held that Mr.
Cutbirth' s opinions were speculative because he did not provide the specific information the
District Court deemed necessary to give such opinion and his conclusions differed from the District
Court's own scientific understanding. R., pp. 897-900.
With regard to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court determined
that Respondent was entitled to summary judgment on Appellant's breach of contract (other than
the failure to pay rent), breach of the implied covenant, and negligence claims. R., pp. 900-928.
As to Appellant's negligence claim specifically, the District Court held Appellant had not
presented admissible evidence of causation, given the exclusion of Appellant's expert witness
testimony. R., pp. 904-910. The District Court concluded that "no rational juror could conclude
from this evidence that Defendant's negligence caused the fire." R., p. 909.
On February 26, 2019, the parties entered into a Stipulation to Dismiss Count I and II. R.,
pp. 935-940. On March 4, 2019, the District Court entered its Order ofDismissal Re: Count I and
II. R., pp. 943-944. Then also on March 4, 2019, the District Court issued its Judgment dismissing
Appellant's negligence claim. R., pp. 941-942.
On April 12, 2019, Appellant filed its Notice ofAppeal. R., pp. 945-950.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in excluding testimony from Appellant's
two expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition to Respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment?

II.

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no
rational juror could conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the fire?

ARGUMENT

A.

APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court's standard of

review is the same as the standard used by the trial court. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services,
143 Idaho 834, 836, 153 P.3d 1180, 1182 (2007), citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax
Comm 'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). All disputed facts are to be construed

liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate
only if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of
law remains, over which the Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review. Id.
The admissibility of expert testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary
judgment "is a threshold matter that is distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues
of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment." Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 173,
335 P.3d 14, 18 (2014), quoting Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000,
1003 (2012). A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as
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an expert. Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834 at 837, 153 P.2d at 1183.
Admissibility of expert testimony is also a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court and
will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. When reviewing an alleged abuse of
discretion by a trial court, the Idaho Supreme Court considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of
discretion. Id.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING
TESTIMONY FROM APPELLANT'S TWO EXPERT WITNESSES REGARDING
CAUSATION IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The District Court ruled that Appellant's expert witness testimony from Dean Hunt and

David Cutbirth regarding causation was inadmissible because it was not based on specialized
knowledge. The District Court erred in excluding the testimony as it failed to recognize and apply
the appropriate test.
The test for admissibility of expert testimony is Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. Weeks v.

Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2007), citing State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,646,962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
I.R.E. 702. "Expert opinion, which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as
evidence." Weeks v. v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184.
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Nevertheless, "the question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's knowledge will
assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the expert's opinion is based is
commonly agreed upon." Id., quoting Merwin, 131 Idaho at 646, 962 P .2d at 1030. The specific
study does not have to be universally accepted in order for experts to validly use the study as a
basis of opinion.

Id.

Instead, the focus of the court's inquiry is on the "principles and

methodology" used not the conclusions they generate. Id.
In the present case, the District Court failed to examine the scientific methodologies
utilized by the experts, but instead inappropriately required specific testimony regarding the fire
ignition sequence and weighed its own scientific understanding against the conclusions of
Appellant's expert witnesses.
A.

The District Court inappropriately excluded Dean Hunt's expert testimony on
causation as it failed to recognize the scientific methodology utilized in
reaching the opinion and inappropriately required specific testimony
regarding the ignition sequence.

In opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff offered the
Declaration of Dean Hunt in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which

attached his expert report. R., pp. 800-831. Mr. Hunt is a fire consultant with Rimkus Consulting
Group, Inc., and has significant experience in fire investigation. R., p. 736. Mr. Hunt has a
Bachelor of Science degree in Public Safety and Emergency Management, and over 30 years'
experience in fire service, including 19 years as a full time Fire Investigator and Fire Marshal. Id.
Mr. Hunt is also a Certified Fire and Explosion Investigator (C.F.E.I.) through the National
Association of Fire Investigators as well as a Certified Fire Inspector II with the International Code
Council (ICC). Id. In addition, he has conducted over 600 fire investigations and over 200 live
fire training tests. Id.
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Mr. Hunt examined the structure and provided the following analysis and conclusion in his
report:
This fire originated in the laundry room located in the northeast comer of
the structure. This determination was based on the observed patterns of fire
damage, witness statements, and a systemic evaluation of the remaining
physical evidence and within a reasonable degree of fire science certainty.
The probable cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that had been
left running prior to the fire. The cause of this fire in undetermined pending
an evaluation by an electrical engineer.
R., p. 814. Thus, it is Mr. Hunt's opinion that the fire began in the laundry room and that the
probable cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running prior to the
fire. Id.
Despite Mr. Hunt's qualified expert report, the District Court held that his testimony was
inadmissible as to his opinion that the dryer was the probable cause of the fire. R., pp. 893-895.
The District Court determined that only Mr. Hunt's opinion that the fire originated in the laundry
room was reached to the degree of certainty accepted within the field of fire science, and that his
opinion regarding the dryer being the probable cause was merely speculation. Id. The District
Court stated that Mr. Hunt was simply making a logical deduction that any person can make (or
choose not to make), and that Mr. Hunt failed to opine on the specific ignition sequence of the fire.
R., p. 895. The District Court's decision to exclude Mr. Hunt's testimony is an abuse of its
discretion as it inappropriately parsed the language of Mr. Hunt's report, failed to recognize the
scientific methodology utilized in reaching both opinions, inappropriately required testimony
regarding the ignition of the fire and inappropriately substituted its own judgment over that of a
highly qualified expert in the field of fire science.
To explain more fully, Mr. Hunt's report contains the following sentence: "This
determination was based on the observed patterns of the fire damage, witness statement, and a
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systematic evaluation of the remaining physical evidence with a reasonable degree of fire science
certainty." R., p. 814. The District Court incorrectly applied this sentence only to Mr. Hunt's
opinion of the origin of the fire. However, when Mr. Hunt's report is read in its entirety his intent
is abundantly clear that the statement applies both to his opinion as to the origin of the fire as well
as to the cause of the fire. Indeed, throughout the report Mr. Hunt describes his methodology in
determining the origin and cause of the fire and they both entail his systemic evaluation of the
structure and process of elimination by examining the remaining physical evidence, the patterns
of fire and smoke damage and the witness statements. Mr. Hunt comes to his conclusions based
on his knowledge, experience and the same methodology of process of elimination. Thus, the
District Court's minute interpretation of this single sentence in Mr. Hunt's report incorrectly
summanzes Mr. Hunt's opinion as both opinions were based on Mr. Hunt's specialized
knowledge.
The District Court also erred in failing to recognize the scientific methodology utilized by
Mr. Hunt in reaching his opinion on causation. While the District Court claimed Mr. Hunt's
opinion was speculation, Mr. Hunt's evaluation of the structure carefully details his process of
elimination in determining the origin of the fire and the cause of the fire. R., pp. 807-814.
Mr. Hunt's report sets forth that he evaluated the two-story commercial building on
October 5, 2017. R., p. 805. He began his evaluation with an examination of the exterior of the
structure. R., p. 807. He methodically examined the west, south, east and north walls, along with
the bum patters and heat and smoke damage to each. R., pp. 807-809. He examined the electrical
meter and main electrical switches on the east end of the south wall and determined that they were
damaged from heat in a manner consistent with external exposure to heat; thus, he eliminated them
as the cause of the fire. R., p. 808. He examined the roof which had collapsed into the structure
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and noted that the fire damaged, bowed, wooden roof beams were lying on the floor of the
structure. R., p. 809.
He then systematically examined the interior of the structure. R., p. 809. He noted that he
examined the main electrical breaker panel on the south wall near the northeast comer of the
structure and found it to be heavily damaged from heat and flame. Id. It was not possible to
identify what position the switches were in and several had indications of electrical activity, but
the surrounding area was examined and the damage to the area where the electrical panel was
located was damaged less than that of other areas of the interior of the structure. Id. Thus, Mr.
Hunt eliminated it as the cause of the fire. Id.
The paint ball arena and props were studied. Id. The props included: wood props, three
vehicles, fabric drapes and plastic sheeting. Id. All were consumed by the fire except for the
vehicles. Id. Mr. Hunt interviewed Defendant's owner Jeremy Haile, and Mr. Haile stated that all
the fuel, oils and batteries had been removed from the vehicles when they were placed inside. Id.
The combustible materials in the vehicles had been consumed by the fire; thus, Mr. Hunt
eliminated them as the cause of the fire. Id.
He then examined the roof truss beams. Id. He noted that the beams were damaged from
heat and flame and that the damage extended from the south end of the structure to the north with
the damage increasing towards the north. Id. The north end of the structure consisted of two CMU
block walled rooms. Id. One of the rooms was located between two overhead doors which was
damaged by heat and flame. R., p. 810. This had been the equipment room where the paintball
guns were serviced, stored and rented to patrons. Id. Mr. Hunt identified the burned remains of
everything in the room and determined that the contents were mostly noncombustible, and the fuel
load was minimal. Id. Accordingly, he eliminated this room as the area of origin. Id.
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The room at the northeast comer of the structure, identified by the owner as the laundry
room, contained a clothes washer, two clothes dryers, an air compressor, refrigerator, a microwave
over, deep freezer and metal shelving that contained plastic masks that the customers wore. Id.
The walls of this room were covered with wood paneling attached to drywall. Id. A restroom was
attached to the south end of the room and an office on the second floor above. Id. Above the open
area and the laundry room was a wood cross-beam that spanned the open area and above the
laundry room. Id. The beam was damage from heat and flame and the damage was more severe
above the southwest comer of the laundry room. Id. All the wood paneling had been consumed.
R., p. 811. Mr. Hunt examined the freezer, microwave and refrigerator and noted that the damage
to all was more intense at the front and decreased towards the rear. Id.

He examined the

compressor and the dryer next to it (the one not being utilized at the time of the fire). Id. The
interior of the dryer was damaged from heat but not from flame. Id. The side of the dryer that
was adjacent to the working dryer had a bum pattern that began at the rear-left comer at the bottom
of the dryer and extended from this point upwards and towards the front of the dryer. R., pp. 811812.
Mr. Hunt then examined the dryer that had been in use. R., p. 812. He provided that there
was a fire pattern along the left side of the dryer that began at the rear bottom comer of the dryer
and extended upward and toward the front of the dryer. Id. The interior was damaged from heat
and flame. Id. There was a bum pattern on the exterior of the dryer, around the front-loading
door. Id. The electrical cord to the dryer was plugged into the 220-Volt outlet at the south wall
of the laundry room and the insulation to cord along the floor to the outlet was still intact. Id. A
flexible dryer vent duct was lying on the floor and was separated from the dryer. Id. There was a
hole melted in the aluminum duct 3 feet from the dryer connection. Id. Mr. Hunt provided that it
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was reported to him by Respondents that prior to the fire the duct was attached at the west wall to
a piece of poly vinyl chloride (PVC) pipe that led to the exterior. Id. The PVC pipe had been
consumed by the fire. Id. Respondents further reported to Mr. Hunt that the dryer was purchased
used approximately twelve years prior to the fire and that it had never had any service or repairs
and the backs of the dryers had never been removed to clean lint from them.

Id. In addition,

Defendants reported to Mr. Hunt that the clothes dryer was left on and running when the last
employee left the business the night of the fire. Id.
Mr. Hunt then determined that the fire originated in the laundry room and that the probable
cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running prior to the fire. R.,
p. 814. His opinion was not based on speculation, but rather his detailed evaluation of the site, the
fire patterns, his process of elimination, the damage to the structure and the items inside, witness
statements and his knowledge and experience. Id.
While the District Court stated that Mr. Hunt did not opine on the specific ignition
sequence, (R., p.895), such is not required. Experts who opine on probable cause in negligence
actions are not required to set forth the specific cause or a specific ignition sequence; it is
sufficient for them to opine as to a reasonably likely cause, and fact witnesses or other experts,
can fill in the details. See Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912,
918-919 (1997) (fire investigation expert's testimony as to several possible causes of fire on
landowner's property was not impermissibly speculative so as to preclude its admission in a
negligence action); Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 14, (2012)
(once medical experts have opined in a negligence action as to the potential sources of an
infection, it does not take expert testimony to establish exactly how a particular person contracted
a particular infection; fact witnesses can provide the necessary details about sanitary conditions,
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contact by or with the infected person, wound care received by the infected person, and the like
in order to fill in the details); and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153
P.3d 1180 (2007) (expert's testimony that infusion was a substantial factor in causing patient's
death to a reasonable medical probability, even though he was unable to determine the exact effect
of the medication on patient and was not certain whether the chemicals themselves, the volume
of fluid, or the combination of the two caused the death, it was based upon sound scientific
principles and thus was admissible in medical malpractice action).
Here, Mr. Hunt's report does exactly what expert reports are supposed to do - it provides
specialized knowledge which would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.

Mr. Hunt employed his scientific methodology and process of

elimination to opine that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer. Contrary to the District
Court's holding, he is not required to provided exactly how the fire was ignited, it is sufficient that
he provided a likely cause and witness testimony regarding the dryer can fill in the rest. As the
District Court correctly recognized, Mr. Hunt's many years of fire service and fire investigation
qualified him to offer his specialized knowledge. R., p. 893. Mr. Hunt explained the methodology
or basis of his opinion was his evaluation of the entire site, his examination of the heat, smoke and
fire damage, his examination of patterns of fire damage in the laundry room and around the dryer,
his interviews of the witnesses and his knowledge of fire science. Accordingly, the District Court
failed to apply the appropriate legal standard here and abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Hunt's
testimony on causation.
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B.

The District Court inappropriately excluded David Cutbirth's expert
testimony on causation in that the court failed to recognize the scientific
methodology utilized in reaching the opinion and inappropriately substituted
its own judgment over that of a highly qualified expert.

To supplement the opinion of Mr. Hunt regarding the probable cause of the fire, Appellant
offered the Declaration of David Cutbirth in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment, which attached his report. R., pp. 794-799. David Cutbirth, PE, is a principal electrical
engineer licensed in the state of Idaho since 1998. R., p. 794. He is also president of DC
Engineering, an organization that provides consulting engineering services for commercial,
industrial, and retail facilities. Id. Mr. Cutbirth opines that it is his "professional opinion that the
fire was not caused by an electrical fault either within the drier or the wiring feeding the drier,"
but that "the fire was caused by combustion within the drier vent, at or near the PVC piping that
was utilized as an extension of a 'short' piece of drier venting to the outside wall exhaust." R., p.
795.

Mr. Cutbirth's conclusions are supported by his knowledge of electricity and the

transformation of energy as an electrical engineer, as well as the methodology he employed and
outlined in his report.
Mr. Cutbirth's declaration and report set forth the methodology and principles he
employed: i.e., his knowledge, his site visit/evaluation, his interview of Plaintiff, and the
International Mechanical Code. R. pp. 797-799. Mr. Cutbirth notes that PVC and/or other nonmetallic hard piped connections were utilized from the drier exhaust to the outside connections.
R., p. 798. He then explains that, pursuant to the International Mechanical Code Section 504.6.1,
exhaust ducts for driers are to be constructed of metal and that no exception was found in the Code
that allows for PVC or other non-metallic substances. R., pp. 795; 798. Mr. Cutbirth explains the
reasoning being that PVC's maximum operating temperature is 140 degrees, while dryer discharge
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temperature may be as high as 155 degrees. Id. He further opines based on his knowledge as an
electrical engineer that PVC is prone for creating static electricity when moving air, which is also
likely to cause a buildup of lint.

Id. These bases appropriately support his conclusion that the

probable cause of the fire was combustion in the drier vent.
The District Court held that Mr. Cutbirth's testimony was inadmissible. R., p. 896. The
District Court determined that Mr. Cutbirth's testimony was speculative because he did not provide
specific information the Court deemed necessary to give such opinions and his opinions differed
from that of the trial court. R., p. 897-900. As set forth above, experts who opine on probable
cause in negligence actions are not required to set forth the specific cause or a specific ignition
sequence; it is sufficient for them to opine as to a reasonably likely cause as long as such testimony
is based on scientific principles and methodology. See Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho
486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919 (1997); Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho
802, 332 P.3d 14, (2012); and Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d
1180 (2007). The District Court abused its discretion by failing to recognize the methodology
employed here by Mr. Cutbirth and by inappropriately substituting its own judgment over that of
a qualified expert. R., pp. 897-900. It is clear from reading the opinion that the District Court had
its own understanding of the scientific principles at issue and that the District Court was comparing
the information provided by Mr. Cutbirth to the District Court's own understanding and then
determining if Mr. Cutbirth's opinions were valid. Id.
Instead of determining whether Mr. Cutbirth's opinions were simply based on scientific
principles and methodology, the District Court questioned and disagreed with Mr. Cutbirth's
conclusions.

The District Court instead relied upon its own understanding of the scientific

principles. To illustrate, the District Court stated the following:
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•

"The Court accepts Mr. Cutbirth' s statement that air moving through a PVC
pipe may build up a static electric charge on the surface of the pipe, although
the Court's understanding is that it is generally solid particulates in the air that
cause such a build-up, not the gas molecules themselves." (R., p. 897.)

•

"Mr. Cutbirth's statement that PVC is prone to static buildup seems unlikely to
be true in humid environments, but is certainly consistent with common
experience in more arid environments, like Boise." (R., p. 897.)

•

"The Court suspects different materials have different fire points and different
ignition temperatures. What is the minimum ignition energy for lint, if that is
what Mr. Cutbirth believes combusted? How much energy does Mr. Cutbirth
think this static discharge had? Can a hunk of PVC pipe this size even store
that much energy in the form of static electricity (i.e., what is the pipe's
capacitance?) If a static discharge occurs, is it always going to discharge all of
its stored electrical energy or will the discharge be more localized because
electrons do no move freely along the surface of an insulator?" (R., p. 898.)

•

"If a static charge built up on the pipe, what happened to cause a discharge? If
the dryer was simply running and no one was around, what happened such that
the electrical energy on the PVC pipe, which was building up because it had no
place to go, suddenly had a place to go? What did it spark to? The aluminum
dryer vent? If so, why wasn't it sparking all the time and how did it build up
enough electrical energy to bring a fuel above the fire point or ignition
temperature when it finally did arc? If it did not spark to something normally in
place, what changed so it suddenly had a place to arc to? Mr. Cutbirth may
have valid scientific reasons why he thinks these things happened; if so, those
reasons do not appear in his report." (R., p. 899.)

•

"His statement about the maximum operating temperature of PVC also do not
appear to support his opinion. PVC is a vinyl. At higher temperatures it softens.
The Court understands the maximum operating temperature to be related to a
PVC's structural integrity; not its flammability. It starts to get soft above 140
degrees Fahrenheit; therefore, it is less capable of supporting loads at those
temperatures. That doesn't mean PVC melts at that temperature and it certainly
doesn't mean PVC will ignite at that temperature. It doesn't mean PVC starts
to give off flammable gas at that temperature. If Mr. Cutbirth believes the lint
was the fuel source, what does the maximum operating temperature of PVC
have to do with how the lint combusted?" (R., p. 899.)

Clearly, these statements demonstrate that the District Court was providing inappropriate expert
testimony and conclusions on the issue and then questioning the conclusions of Mr. Cutbirth.
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"[T]he admissibility stage is not subject to an adversarial process." Nield v. Pocatello Health
Services, Inc., 156 Idaho at 811, 332 P.3d at 723. "In other words, in determining whether an
expert's testimony is admissible, '[t]he Court must look at the affidavit or deposition testimony
and determine whether it alleges facts, which if taken as true, would render the testimony
admissible."' Id., quoting Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 (2006). In
determining admissibility, the trial court must consider only the opinion testimony of the expert;
it is error for the trial court to base its determination solely on the grounds that the expert did not
counter the various possibilities suggested by an opposing expert, (or in this case the District
Court). Id. Here, the District Court did not consider only the opinion of Mr. Cutbirth, but the
District Court's own opinions as well, and then determined that Mr. Cutbirth did not answer all of
the District Court's questions and possibilities. Mr. Cutbirth's testimony that the fire was caused
by combustion within the dryer vent at or near the PVC piping was sufficient under Rule 702 as it
was supported by Mr. Cutbirth's expert knowledge of static electricity, his site evaluation,
interviews with witnesses and the International Mechanical Code. Accordingly, the District Court
failed to apply the appropriate legal standard here and abused its discretion in excluding Mr.
Cutbirth' s testimony on causation.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment and Concluding that No
Rational Juror Could Conclude that Defendant's Negligence Caused the Fire
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states that a court may only grant summary

judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(a). Therefore, the burden is on the
movant to show that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist. Tingle v. Harrison, 125 Idaho
86, 89, 867 P .2d 960, 963 ( 1994) ("The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at
all times upon the moving party."). When examining the evidence, the court is required "to
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liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, and to draw
all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party." Loomis v. Hailey, 119
434,436, 807 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1991). "If the record contains conflicting inferences or reasonable
minds might reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied." Id.
In the present case the District Court determined that Respondent was entitled to summary
judgment on Appellant's negligence claim.

R., pp. 903-910.

"A cause of action

for negligence includes proof of: ( 1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform
to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage." Cramer v. Slater,
146 Idaho 868,204 P.3d 508 (2009), quoting Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,
399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). Here, the District Court only addressed causation and determined
there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact relating to causation and that no rational juror
could conclude that Defendant's negligence caused the fire and Plaintiffs damages. R., pp. 906910.
Proximate cause is composed of two elements, cause in fact or "actual cause" and scope of
legal responsibility. Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1039-41, 895 P.2d 1229,
1232-34 (Ct.App.1995). "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event
produced a particular consequence." Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,288, 127 P.3d 187, 191
(2005). True proximate cause "focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility will
be extended to the consequences of conduct which as has occurred." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho
868,875,204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff set forth evidence through declarations, expert reports and
deposition testimony that Defendant's negligent installation and maintenance of the dryer caused
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the fire. To begin with, Jeremy Haile testified during his deposition that the dryer was hooked up
in a make-shift and unorthodox manner in that they used a piece of PVC (poly vinyl chloride) pipe
to attach the dryer to the west wall. R., pp. 671:12-673:12. The PVC pipe was inserted into the
dryer's flexible aluminum dryer vent, which funnels out the dryer's hot air, and was attached to
the wall that led to the exterior. Id. Mr. Haile testified that they bought the dryer used and since
its purchase they had not serviced or repaired the dryer, nor had they ever taken off the back and
cleaned out the lint. R., p. 679:2-6. He further testified that on the night of the fire, August 11,
201 7, his last employee to leave the building left a load of laundry running in the washing machine
and clothes dryer. R., pp. 618:9-619.
Plaintiff then provided the expert report and declaration of Dean Hunt. As provide above,
Mr. Hunt is a fire consultant with over 30 years' experience in fire service and 19 years as a fire
investigator and Fire Marshall. R. p. 736. Mr. Hunt determined that the fire originated in the
laundry room and that the probable cause of the fire was the dryer in the laundry room that had
been left running prior to the fire. R., p. 814. Mr. Hunt's conclusions were supported by his
knowledge of fire science and the methodology he employed and outlined in his report, specifically
his examination of the fire scene and interviews with witnesses. R., pp. 805-814. His evaluation
of the structure detailed his process of elimination in determining the origin of the fire and the
cause of the fire. Id. Mr. Hunt stated that there were bum patterns on the dryer that extended from
the rear bottom comer upward toward the front of the dryer. R., p. 812. The interior of the dryer
was damaged from heat and flame. Id. The burned remains of fabric were inside the drum. Id.
The insulation of the electrical cord that was plugged into the outlet at the south wall had been
consumed by the fire from where the cord attached to the dryer and dropped down the back of the
dryer to the floor. Id. A flexible dryer vent duct was lying on floor separated from the dryer. Id.
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There was a hole melted in the aluminum duct 3 feet from the dryer connection. Id.

Mr. Hunt

then noted that prior to the fire, this duct was attached at the west wall to a piece of Poly Vinyl
Choride (PVC) pipe that led to the exterior and the PVC pipe had been consumed by fire. Id. In
addition, Mr. Hunt noted that the dryer was old, no service or repairs had been done to the dryer
since its purchase and the back of the dryer had never been removed to clean lint from it. Id.
Plaintiff also provided the expert report and declaration of David Cutbirth. As provided
above, Mr. Cutbirth is a principal electrical engineer licensed in the state of Idaho with over 21
years of experience. R., p. 794. Mr. Cutbirth opined that it was his "professional opinion that the
fire was not caused by an electrical fault either within the drier or the wiring feeding the drier,"
but that "the fire was caused by combustion within the drier vent, at or near the PVC piping that
was utilized as an extension of a 'short' piece of drier venting to the outside wall exhaust." R., p
795.

Mr. Cutbirth's conclusions were supported by his knowledge of electricity and the

transformation of energy as an electrical engineer, as well as the methodology he employed and
outlined in his report. R., pp. 794-799. Mr. Cutbirth explained that pursuant to the International
Mechanical Code Section 504.6.1, exhaust ducts for driers are to be construed of metal, not PVC
or some other non-metallic substances. R., pp. 795; 798. Mr. Cutbirth explained the reasoning
being that PVC's maximum operating temperature is 140 degrees, while dryer discharge
temperature may be as high as 155 degrees. Id. He further opined based on his knowledge as an
electrical engineer that PVC is prone for creating static electricity when moving air, which is also
likely to cause a buildup of lint.

Id. These bases appropriately support his conclusion that the

probable cause of the fire was combustion in the drier vent.
Thus, Appellant set forth more than sufficient evidence of causation (both cause in fact and
proximate cause) that Respondent's negligent installation and maintenance of the dryer caused the
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fire and Appellant's damage. Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment
and in concluding that no rational juror could conclude that Respondent's negligence caused the
fire.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant Tech Landing, LLC, respectfully requests that the
Court: ( 1) Reverse the District Court's decision to exclude the testimony from Appellant's two
expert witnesses regarding causation in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment; (2) Reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment on Appellant's
negligence claim; and (3) Remand the case to the District Court for trial on Appellant's negligence
claim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October, 2019.
SASSER & JACOBSON, PLLC

By: /s/ James F. Jacobson
James F. Jacobson
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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C.W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
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Fax: (208) 344-5510
pcollaer@ajhlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant
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DATED this 9th day of October, 2019.
SASSER & JACOBSON, PLLC

By: /s/ James F. Jacobson
James F. Jacobson, Of the Firm
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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